This paper develops an overlapping generations model with stochas-
Introduction
The current U.S. pay-as-you go social security system was introduced in 1935, partly as a response to the impoverishment of an entire generation during the great depression, the biggest negative aggregate shock the U.S. economy has experienced so far. In the current political and academic debate about social security reform one of the major concerns cited by the opponents of a reform towards a funded system is the risk of low returns to savings for an entire generation due to a large and long unfavorable aggregate shock (see Aaron et al. (2001) or Burtless (2001) for a discussion).
Despite the fact that the role an unfunded social security system may play in facilitating the allocation of aggregate risk among generations was a key consideration in its introduction and is a key discussion point in its current reform debate, academic research on the role of social security in models with aggregate uncertainty, which a®ects di®erent generations along di®erent margins, remains limited.
As Bohn (1998 Bohn ( , 1999 has argued, if returns to capital and wages are imperfectly correlated and subject to aggregate shocks, then the consumption variance of all generations can be reduced if private markets or government policies enable them to pool their labor and capital incomes. A social security system that endows retired households with a claim to labor income may serve as such an e®ective tool to share aggregate risk between generations, in the absence of¯nancial securities that achieve the same risk allocation.
It is the goal of this paper to evaluate the quantitative importance of this intergenerational risk sharing role of social security, in comparison to the more traditional arguments of reducing overaccumulation of capital and intragenerational insurance and redistribution. In order to give this question historical content we ask whether, in a situation like in 1935, after a large adverse macroeconomic shock, it is possible to justify the introduction of a unfunded, redistributive pay-as-you go social security system on the normative grounds that it provides a welfare improvement, in the sense of ex-interim Pareto e±ciency. That is, we ask whether it is possible that the economy in 1935 was in an aggregate state such that the introduction of a unfunded, redistributive pay-as-you go social security system, as implemented by the Roosevelt administration increased utility of all generations then alive and expected utility for all future generations to be born, where a generation is not only identi¯ed by the time of birth, but also by the node of the event tree at which it is born.
We¯nd that in realistically calibrated economies intergenerational risk sharing alone is unlikely to provide, based on a ex-interim Pareto criterion, a rationale for the introduction of an unfunded social security system. However, this result depends crucially on the calibration as well as on the assumption that we consider a closed economy. We also provide numerical examples where social security leads to considerable, Pareto-improving, welfare gains, both in a closed economy and in a small open economy. The introduction of an unfunded redistributive, payroll-tax¯nanced social security system a®ects the competitive equilibrium in a number of ways. It reduces the capital accumulation in the economy and distorts the laborleisure decision, but also may provide intragenerational and intergenerational risk-sharing and redistribution. Since the main focus of the paper is evaluate the quantitative intergenerational risk sharing role of social security, we consider an economy in which all other e®ects of introducing an unfunded redistributive social security system, besides the adverse e®ects on capital accumulation are absent. This economy is populated by three generations at each point of time and there is no heterogeneity within each generation (and therefore no intragenerational redistribution or insurance motive of social security). The stochastic labor endowment is inelastically supplied. The only asset available for trade between generations is physical capital, which yields stochastic returns. The introduction of physical capital with stochastic returns has a two-fold motivation:¯rst it enables intergenerational trade, so that social security is not the only mechanism of consumption smoothing over time (as in Rangel and Zeckhauser (1997) , Bohn (1999) and many others), and second, it allows us to re-examine Diamond's (1965) discussion of production ine±ciency of competitive equilibrium in a stochastic environment.
In order to discuss e±ciency properties of equilibrium allocations it is crucial to make precise the di®erent notions of e±ciency used in this paper. By Pareto e±ciency we mean Pareto e±ciency in the ex interim sense as de¯ned above. We say that an allocation is production e±cient if there exist is no alternative allocation for which aggregate consumption is weakly higher at every node and strictly higher at some node of the event tree. We attribute this notion of e±ciency to Diamond (1965) and Zilcha (1990) .
Finally, we say an allocation is dynamically e±cient, if there is no set of intergenerational transfers of consumption that lie in the marketed subspan of the consumption set and that make every generation as least as well o® and some generation strictly better o® (again in an ex interim sense). We attribute this notion of e±ciency to Samuelson (1957) and Demange (2001) .
In this paper we want to focus on cases where the level of capital ac-cumulation is production-e±cient and where the consumption allocation is dynamically e±cient. If markets are sequentially complete, in that agents can trade a full set of claims contingent on the realization of aggregate uncertainty then an equilibrium allocation is Pareto e±cient if and only if it is dynamically e±cient. The presence of incomplete markets, however leads to a possible divergence of these e±ciency criteria and the introduction of an unfunded social security system can be Pareto improving. We focus on dynamically e±cient allocations because empirical evidence seems to suggest that the US economy is dynamically e±cient (see Abel et al. (1989) ) and because we want to separate intergenerational risk sharing from ine±ciency of the Samuelson type.
Via numerical examples we then demonstrate that the introduction of social security into the competitive economy can lead to a welfare improving consumption allocation in the Pareto sense, even though the original allocation was not dynamically ine±cient. This Pareto improvement is purely due to enhanced intergenerational risk sharing of imperfectly correlated shocks to the returns to labor and capital. We then argue, however, that for realistically calibrated examples the risk sharing bene¯ts of an unfunded social security system tend to be dominated by its negative a®ect on capital accumulation. As we show, if one is willing to make a small open economy assumption and thus shut down the latter e®ect, then even for realistically calibrated examples the introduction of an unfunded social security system may constitute a Pareto improvement.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the model, de¯ne equilibrium and e±cient allocations, and describe the numerical algorithm to compute a (functional rational expectations) equilibrium. Section 3 relates our paper to the existing literature and summarizes theoretical results that can be established about the e±ciency of equilibrium in our model, for the various notions of e±ciency de¯ned before. In Section 4 we provide a¯rst quantitative example that demonstrates the potential for social security to provide a Pareto improvement by enhancing intergenerational risk sharing and discuss whether the same Pareto improvement could be achieved with¯nancial innovation (the introduction of additional assets) rather than the introduction of an unfunded social security system. Section 5 discusses the calibration of the model and Section 6 summarizes our main results,¯rst for a closed and then for a small open economy version of our model. Final conclusions are contained in Section 7 and all¯gures are contained in the appendix.
The Economic Model
Time is discrete and extends from t = 0; : : : ; 1: Aggregate uncertainty is represented by an event tree. The root of the tree is given by some¯xed event z 0 . Each node of the tree is a history of exogenous shocks to the economy z t = (z 0 ; z 1 : : : z t ). Let by ¼ t (z t ) denote the probability that the node z t occurs.
The shocks are assumed to follow a Markov chain with¯nite support Z and with transition matrix ¦. There are three commodities at each node, labor, a single consumption good and a capital good which can only be used as an input to production.
Households
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of agents that live for 3 periods. The population growth rate is given by n. In each period t, L t = (1 + n)L t¡1 identical new households are born. By L 0 = 1 let denote the number of newborns in period 0: A household is fully characterized by the node in which she is born (z t ). To simplify notation, we collect all households which are alive at some node z t in a set I z t and denote a typical household by i 2 I z t . When there is no ambiguity about the identity of households we will index households simply by their time of birth.
An agent born at node z s has non-negative, possibly stochastic labor endowment over her life-cycle, ((l 0 (z t ); l 1 (z t+1 ); l 2 (z t+2 )), that we assume to depend only on the current aggregate shock. The price of the consumption good at each date event is normalized to one and at each date event z t the household supplies her labor endowment inelastically for a market wage w(z t ).
Let by c s t (z t ) denote the consumption of an agent born at time s in period t¸s: Individuals value consumption according to
where u : < ++ ! < is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly concave, C 2 and to satisfy the Inada condition lim c!0 u 0 (c) = 1.
Households have access to a storage technology: they can use one unit of the consumption good to obtain one unit of the capital good next period. We denote the investment of household s into this technology by a s t (z t ). All agents are born with zero assets, a s s¡1 (z s¡1 ) = 0: We do not restrict a s t (z t )¸0, because we want to permit households to borrow against future labor income. One possible interpretation of this assumption is that there is a bank which acts as an intermediary and which stores the capital good for all households, and each individual household can then borrow from this bank. At time t the household sells its capital goods accumulated from last period, a s t¡1 (z t¡1 ), to the¯rm for a market price r(z t ) > 0: We assume that the capital good cannot be converted back to the consumption good, so that it is optimal for the household to always sell all the capital goods accumulated from last period. The budget constraint of household s in period t¸s therefore reads as
where ¿ is the payroll tax to¯nance social security payments, b(z t ) are the social security bene¯ts received by a retired agent 1 and I(s) is the indicator function, with I(s = 3) = 1 and I(s) = 0 for s = 1; 2:
To start o® the economy we assume that at the root node, i.e. in period zero, there are L 0 =(1+n) i households of ages i = 0; 1; 2 who enter the period with given capital holdings a 0 ¡1 ; a 
Firms
There is a single representative¯rm which in each period t uses labor and capital to produce the consumption good according to a constant returns to scale production function f t (K; L; z t ). Since¯rms make their decisions on how much capital to buy and how much labor to hire after the realization of the shock z t they face no uncertainty and simply maximize current period pro¯ts. This allows us to abstract from problems which usually occur when one tries to incorporate production into a model with uncertainty and incomplete¯nancial markets (see Magill and Quinzii (1996) for an overview). In order to do so, however, one needs to make the somewhat nonstandard assumption that households have access to a safe technology which turns period t ¡ 1 consumption goods into period t capital goods. We also assume that households sell, rather than rent the capital to¯rms for consumption goods. 2 These assumptions are necessary to prevent households from consuming the capital at the beginning of the period instead of renting it to the¯rm in states where the net return to capital is negative.
In the examples below we will always use the following parametric form for the production function.
where´(:) is the stochastic shock to productivity, where ±(:) may be interpreted as the (possibly) stochastic depreciation rate if ±(:) 2 [0; 1]; and where F (:; :) is a constant returns to scale production function. In order to assure that the economy, on average, grows at rate g we need to assume that exogenous technological progress is labor augmenting, unless F is of Cobb-Douglas form. Under this assumption, since shocks to production are multiplicative as in Diamond (1967) , our model is equivalent to a model where¯rm rents the capital at the beginning of the previous period and where households have no storage technologies at their disposal.
Government
The only role the government has is to levy payroll taxes to pay for social security bene¯ts. We model social security as a de¯ned contribution pay-asyou-go system that adheres to period by period budget balance, with size characterized by the payroll tax rate ¿: This requires that taxes and bene¯ts
where L(z t ) is total labor input at node z t and L t¡2 = (1+n) t¡2 is the total number of retired people in the economy.
Markets
In this simple economy the only markets are spot markets for consumption, labor and capital, all of which are assumed to be perfectly competitive. Occasionally we will compare the equilibrium welfares to the ones obtained in a benchmark economy with sequentially complete markets. In this framework, markets are sequentially complete when in each period t ]Z Arrow securities are traded.
Equilibrium
is a collection of choices for households (c s t (z t ); a s t (z t )) s+2 t=s ; for all t; z t for the representative¯rm fK(z t ); L(z t )g; a policy f¿; b(z t )g as well as prices fr(z t ); w(z t )g for all z t , t = 0; : : : 1, such that 1. Given fr(z t ); w(z t )g 1 t=0 ; and f¿; b(z t )g for all z t the choices fc s t (z t ); a s t (z t )g s+2 t=s maximize (1), subject to (2) 2. Given r(z t ); w(z t ) the¯rm maximizes pro¯ts, i.e.
3. The government policy satis¯es (4)
Note that by Walras law market clearing in the labor and capital market imply market clearing in the consumption goods market. Note furthermore that with the assumptions on the parametric form of the production function concavity and di®erentiability of F imply that equilibrium prices satisfy w(z
Stationary Equilibrium
In order to solve for the equilibrium numerically using recursive techniques we¯rst have to de-trend the economy by deterministic population growth and technological progress. In order to do so we now make the assumption that the period utility function is of CRRA form
De¯ning, for an arbitrary agent°s
the lifetime utility function of an agent born into node z s can be rewritten as
The budget constraint can be rewritten as, dividing by (1 + g) t°s
where
(1+g) t is the growth-adjusted wage rate and À(z t ) = b(z t ) (1+g) t is the growth-adjusted social security bene¯t.
In the¯rms problem, de¯ning
we rewrite (6) and (7) as
The equilibrium conditions become
Finally, the government budget constraint becomes, dividing both sides by
The Euler equations from the individuals' optimization problem read as
where r(z t ; z t+1 ) is given from (9); with · and l de¯ned from (10) and (11): Our numerical algorithm will operate on the recursive version of these Euler equations.
Functional Rational Expectation Equilibrium
In order to compute equilibrium allocations numerically we have to reformulate the Euler equations recursively. In order to make precise the object we are actually computing we now de¯ne a Functional Rational Expectations Equilibrium (FREE), following the approach of Spear (1988) . A FREE is abstractly de¯ned as a collection of intervals [® i ; ¹ ® i ]; for i = 1; 2 and smooth functions
2 and all possible shocks z 2 Z, which map the current distribution of asset holdings into asset holdings tomorrow for an agent of age i; given that today's aggregate shock is z: For these intervals and functions to be a FREE it has to be the case that for all initial z 2 Z and for all (®
there exists a competitive equilibrium which satis¯es
for all z t and all s = t ¡ 1; t. Note that, since agents don't leave bequests, agents of age 3 choose ® t¡3 t (z t )´0 and thus we do not have to solve for their optimal capital holdings explicitly.
Since agents face a¯nite dimensional, convex optimization problem the Euler equations are necessary and su±cient for agents' optimality. A functional rational expectations equilibrium can therefore be characterized as the solution to a functional equation derived from the recursive version of the Euler equations (13) . Given policy functions (µ i z ) i=1;2 for assets saved for next period, with µ 3 z (:) = 0 and some vector of asset holdings at the beginning of the current period £ = (
Also, denote by
) with £ +0 = 0 the vector of asset holdings at the beginning of the next period, consistent with the policy functions (µ i z ) i=1;2 as well as current asset holdings £. Using the asset market clearing condition in the¯rms optimization conditions we obtain prices, as functions of the current state, as
and for all £ 2 [
Welfare and E±ciency of Competitive Equilibrium
In order to make precise the welfare consequences of di®erent social security reforms we now de¯ne several e±ciency criteria along which we compare allocations arising from these reforms. Since lifetime utilities in the original and the growth-adjusted equilibrium di®er by a monotonically increasing transformation, comparing either allocations will yield the same welfare conclusions, so we focus on the original allocations c, keeping in mind that our computational algorithm delivers growth-de°ated consumption processes°: De¯ne as expected utility of an agent born into event history z t
As we mentioned in the introduction we want to focus on the notion of ex interim (conditional) e±ciency in this paper. First we de¯ne a feasible allocation De¯nition 2 An allocation (c; K) is feasible if c¸0; K¸0 and
for all t and z t ; where
is aggregate, exogenously given labor supply and
is aggregate consumption.
Now we can de¯ne our notion of e±ciency.
De¯nition 3 A feasible allocation (c; K) is ex interim e±cient if there is no other feasible allocation (ĉ;K) such that U(zA stronger notion of e±ciency would be to consider ex ante e±ciency as for example in Bohn (2000) . However, as mentioned in the introduction we want to focus on the ex interim notion, as any policy reform that provides a Pareto improvement in an ex-interim sense, evidently provides a Pareto improvement in the ex-ante sense. That is, by considering ex-interim e±-ciency we demand a lot from a particular policy innovation; if we can in fact nd such a policy reform, we would conclude that its welfare bene¯ts are not subject to the discussion of having speci¯ed the right welfare criterion. 3 
The Thought Experiment
It is well known that in our setup equilibrium allocations are generally suboptimal and that a central planner could¯nd Pareto-improving transfers. However, when discussing possible risk-sharing bene¯ts of a pay-as-you-go social security system we are focusing on a particular intervention. We certainly do not argue that a social security system guarantees full e±ciency and we do not attempt to explain why this particular system is in place. We do want to examine if it can be Pareto-improving to introduce social security.
In this paper we will be interested in the following comparative statics exercise: Suppose that in an equilibrium of the economy for a payroll tax rate ¿ = 0 at some date-event z t , there is an unanticipated increase of ¿ . What are the welfare e®ects for all individuals born at z t and at all successor nodes?
In order to determine whether an introduction of a social security system (i.e. an increase of ¿ to a positive value) is ex interim Pareto-improving, one needs to compare welfare at in¯nitely many nodes. In the examples below, we report welfare gains for the next 3 periods (which corresponds to 60 years) and verify that the qualitative conclusions remain the same over 5-6 periods. It turns out that in our examples we do not have to consider more periods.
In any F.R.E.E., the welfare of a newly born depends solely on the aggregate state (i.e. exogenous shock, aggregate capital and the share of capital held by the middle aged) when born. Clearly the endogenous state at z t will only depend on z t¡1 as well as on the aggregate state at node z t¡2 .
In all the examples we consider an introduction of social security leads to a reduction of capital accumulation. After a transition, which takes around 3-4 periods, the e®ects of K(z t¡2 ) on the current state at z t are extremely small and can be neglected. In this case, only the current shock and the two previous shocks matter, and, for all practical purposes, social security is Pareto-improving, if and only if it leads to an improvement in welfares for the¯rst 6 periods after its introduction.
3 Incomplete Markets and Intergenerational Risk Sharing
Is a Pareto Improvement through Social Security Possible?
Ever since Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965) it is well known that overlapping generation models can exhibit Pareto suboptimal equilibria. In exchange economies, transfers from young to old agents can be Paretoimproving. In economies with production a reduction in capital accumulation can lead to Pareto improvement through higher aggregate consumption at all future dates. However, the introduction of uncertainty into the basic model adds a variety of complications (even if one focuses on the notion of interim optimality as described above). Zilcha's (1990) concept of production e±ciency is a natural generalization of Diamond's characterization of dynamic e±ciency in production: an equilibrium is production e±cient if there do not exist alternative production plans which lead to higher aggregate consumption at all nodes in a subtree. However, as Barbie et al. (2000) point out, e±ciency in production does not necessarily imply Pareto e±ciency and there can be room for Pareto-improving interventions even if the allocation is production e±cient. It is therefore useful to distinguish between production ine±ciency and dynamic ine±ciency in the sense of Samuelson (1958) : even if an equilibrium is production e±cient, there is a theoretical possibility that social security is Pareto improving because the allocation is not dynamically e±cient.
When markets are sequentially complete, however, a su±ciently high return on available assets can be shown to rule out dynamic ine±ciency. In this case equilibrium allocations are Pareto optimal and social security can never be Pareto improving. Judging from available data on past returns it is commonly believed that the US economy is dynamically e±cient (see e.g. Abel et al. (1989) ). Moreover (and perhaps more convincingly) an asset that promises to pay a non-negligible fraction of aggregate consumption at each state of the world in the future can only have a¯nite price today if the allocation is dynamically e±cient. Since land can be interpreted as such an asset (see Demange (2001) ) it seems empirically implausible to consider dynamically ine±cient economies.
However, the conclusion that dynamic e±ciency implies Pareto e±ciency obviously depends crucially on the assumption that markets are sequentially complete. If markets are incomplete allocations will generally not be Pareto e±cient, even if land has a¯nite price and returns of assets are high.
In this paper we focus on economies where markets are not sequentially complete. While it is well known that equilibria will generally not be Pareto e±cient, it is unknown whether one-sided intergenerational transfers (like social security) can possibly lead to Pareto-improvements in these models.
We want to present examples where, judging from the rates of return on capital, the allocation is dynamically e±cient (i.e. the rates of return would pass Abel et al.'s (1989) test and the price of land could be¯nite) but where the introduction of a social security system is Pareto improving. For this, we need to review the conditions which imply dynamic e±ciency and demonstrate why there can be room for a Pareto improvement through enhanced intergenerational risk sharing even if the allocation is production e±cient and dynamically e±cient.
Theoretical Results
Demange (2001) generalizes the notion of dynamic e±ciency to economies with uncertainty and possibly incomplete security markets. 4 A given sequence of aggregate capital stocks (K(z t )) de¯nes the set of achievable allocations. We call an allocation dynamically e±cient, if there exists no other allocation in the marketed subspace which constitutes a Pareto improvement. While in¯nite horizon models or in models with in¯nitely lived agents, competitive equilibria will always be dynamically e±cient, Samuelson's argument for possible ine±ciency can be applied when consider a model with overlapping generations.
In the following we characterize dynamically e±cient allocations for our economy (the analysis follows directly from Demange (2001) -the only difference is that we consider homothetic economies with growth in population and productivity).
For each value of the shock z, de¯ne a production function in intensive units by
De¯ne a supporting price system (q(z t )) by q(z 0 ) = 1 and
Evidently, since markets are not sequentially complete there are several supporting price systems. We collect them in a set Q. The following proposition (Theorem 1 in Demange (2001)) characterizes dynamic e±ciency:
Proposition 4 An equilibrium allocation is dynamically e±cient if
The proposition is remarkable since it is su±cient for optimality that the in¯mum over all supporting prices tends to zero. This implies that we can verify dynamic e±ciency if we¯nd some supporting price system that satis¯es condition (15) .
For general economies this condition can obviously not be easily veri¯ed since it involves prices`at in¯nity'. However, in our framework we focus on functional rational expectations equilibria as de¯ned in Section 2.7 above and a su±cient condition for dynamic e±ciency is the following. For a given time horizon T de¯ne the T -expected discounted present value by
If for large enough T this present value is less than 1, the associated equilibrium is dynamically e±cient. The following lemma makes this su±cient condition precise.
Lemma 5 A FREE is dynamically e±cient if there exists a T > 0 such that for all initial conditions
the resulting equilibrium returns satisfy R(T ) < 1:
® 2 ] themselves and can be viewed as initial conditions as well. Therefore it follows that R(iT ) ! 0 as i ! 1 De¯ning
then implies the su±cient condition (15) . QED In applications below it often su±ces to consider T = 2. Note that with Jensen's inequality for T = 1, the lemma implies that the allocation is dynamically e±cient if the conditional expected returns to capital lies above (1+r)(1+n) for all possible states in the invariant set. While this is a strong condition that does not hold in all examples, it actually already holds true for the calibrated examples in Section 6.
When markets are sequentially complete, dynamic e±ciency implies full Pareto e±ciency. It follows directly from Zilcha (1990) that independently of the market structure allocations are also production e±cient if (15) holds true. In the examples below we show that without complete markets allocations might be dynamically e±cient but not Pareto e±cient and that the introduction of social security might be Pareto-improving because it enhances intergenerational risk sharing.
As mentioned above, we focus on dynamically e±cient allocations for two reasons. Observed returns on risky capital seem to indicate that the US economy is dynamically e±cient (e.g. Abel et a (1996) ). Secondly, as Demange (2001) shows, the presence of`land', i.e. an in¯nitely lived assets which pays out a non-negligible fraction of aggregate consumption at all states and times ensures that condition (15) must hold.
Even though we do not model land explicitly in our analysis, it is important to point out that our result does not crucially depend on the absence of land'. Although a¯nite price of land implies dynamic e±ciency, this does not imply full Pareto e±ciency in our setup. While it is well known that in models with two-period lived agents (and no within generation heterogeneity) land implies full e±ciency even when markets are incomplete (see e.g. Demange (2001)), it is subject to future research to examine if there are realistic cases where there is room for intergenerational risk sharing in economies with land.
Finally, a possible caveat in the interpretation of dynamic ine±ciency has to be pointed out: when markets are sequentially complete, whether or not the allocation is dynamically e±cient cannot be judged by the returns to risky capital alone. In order to verify whether conditions (15) holds one has to recover the unique supporting prices q(z t ) from the knowledge of returns to all securities. In particular, it is very well possible that with sequentially complete markets the allocation is dynamically ine±cient although the return process to risky capital satis¯es the condition in Lemma 1. Furthermore, as we show below, it is possible that the allocation was dynamically e±cient with incomplete markets while the introduction of new securities leads to higher savings rates which`push' the economy into a dynamically ine±cient region.
Pareto Improvement from Social Security: An Example
In this section we present an example where even though the economy is dynamically e±cient the introduction of an unfunded social security system leads to signi¯cant welfare improvements. The example considered is not meant to be a description of the US economy but simply an illustration of our main point. For simplicity we assume that there is no population or technology growth.
The production function is of the Cobb-Douglas form with a labor share of ® = 0:3: There are two possible exogenous shocks which are i.i.d. with probability 1=2. They only a®ect depreciation ±. We assume ±(z 1 ) = 1:0, ±(z 2 ) = 0:2 and »(z 1 ) = »(z 2 ) = 15
Individuals are endowed with 6 units of the consumption good when young and 4 units when middle-aged. They have no endowments when old. Agents' risk aversion is ¾ = 4 and they do not discount the future,¯= 1.
Welfare Consequences from the Introduction of Unfunded Social Security
In this economy, without social security, the conditional expected returns to capital always lie above the population growth rate n plus the average growth rate of the economy g:
We consider an introduction of social security with a social security tax of 8 percent, ¿ = 0:08. Welfare gains (in terms of wealth equivalent) for generations born after introduction in shock 1 are summarized in Figure 1 , where at each node of the event tree we indicate the sequence of shocks and the welfare gains in percent. 5 The¯gure shows that even 5 periods after the introduction of social security, the welfare gains are around 3 percent, at which level they stabilize for future generations.
Financial Innovations versus Unfunded Social Security
One could argue that instead of introducing an unfunded social security system the introduction of new securities (e.g. riskless borrowing) is a better policy recommendation since it leads to sequentially complete markets and possibly full Pareto e±ciency.
However, things are not this simple. In our example, the introduction of an additional security (which sequentially completes the markets, since the aggregate shock can only take two values) actually leads to huge welfare losses for all future generations, as shown in Figure 2 (the current old and middle aged gain as usual). We assume that instead of introducing social security, at the same date-event an additional asset, namely a risk-free bond is introduced.
The reason for this counterintuitive result is simple: With incomplete markets, capital is an asset with very bad risk-characteristics. With complete markets, a large part of this risk can be diversi¯ed away and the middle aged invest huge amounts in this asset to save for retirement.
It should be noted, however, that this part of the example crucially depends on the absence of land in the model. The allocation after the completion of¯nancial markets is no longer dynamically e±cient. We now move to more realistic examples, where the e®ects turn out to be ambiguous.
Calibration
In order to parameterize the model we have to choose the following parameters. We have to characterize the aggregate stochastic process govern-ing total factor productivity and stochastic depreciation, population growth and the life-cycle labor income pro¯le, average economic growth, the capital share in the production function and parameters governing preferences.
Aggregate Growth and Technology
As population growth rate we choose n = 1:1% per annum, which equals the average population growth rate for the US postwar period. Similarly we choose the average growth rate of GDP per hour worked equal to g = 1:6%; the long-run average for the US. The labor share in the Cobb-Douglas production function is taken to be ® = 0:3:
We assume that aggregate uncertainty is driven by a four-state Markov chain with state space Z = fz 1 ; z 2 ; z 3 ; z 4 g and transition matrix ¼ = (¼ ij ): Since we want to model both shocks to total factor productivity and to depreciation, a particular state z i maps into a combination of low or high TFP and low or high depreciation.
Here ¹ ± is the average depreciation rate. We set ¹ ± = 0:7; re°ecting an average depreciation rate of 6% per year.
We assume that the stochastic process is iid over time. Although it is well-established that aggregate technology shocks are positively correlated at a quarterly or yearly frequency, we are not aware of conclusive evidence indicating such positive serial correlation over 20 year periods. Therefore, as a benchmark, we assume that technology shocks are uncorrelated across time (see also Smetters 2001) . Given this assumption the transition matrix is determined by the probabilities ¼ i ; i = 1; : : : ; 4 for a particular aggregate state.
The aggregate state z 1 is characterized by a good TFP-shock and a good depreciation shock (low depreciation), whereas z 4 features a bad TFP shock and a bad depreciation shock. In aggregate states z 2 and z 3 the TFP-shock and depreciation shock move in opposite direction. We make a symmetry assumption in that ¼ 1 = ¼ 4 and ¼ 2 = ¼ 3 : Given the restriction The remaining technology parameters to be calibrated to selected observations from US data are thus (º; Ã; ¼ 1 ): Their selection will be discussed below.
Preference Parameters and Labor Endowments
Labor endowments are deterministic and set as l 0 = 0:485; l 1 = 0:515 and l 2 = 0; so that young agents have labor income of 94%; relative to middleaged agents, consistent with Hansen (1993) , who reports average labor e±-ciency units of individuals of age 35, relative to those of age 55, of 94%: Old agents are assumed to retire.
As benchmark value for the coe±cient of relative risk aversion we choose ¾ = 1; this value is at the low end of the values commonly used in the macroeconomic and public¯nance literature (see Imrohoroglu et al. (1995) for an overview) and our welfare numbers thus provide a lower bound for the potentially bene¯cial intergenerational risk sharing e®ect of social security. At times we will also report results for ¾ = 4; a value for risk aversion at the higher end of the range commonly employed in the literature.
The time discount factor¯will be chosen jointly with (º; Ã; ¼ 1 ) to selected US data.
Social Security
As policies we consider various sizes of the social security system. We assume that all working agents pay a¯xed payroll tax ¿¸0; bene¯ts are then adjusted to preserve period-by-period budget balance, given the payroll tax rate. We consider various sizes of the social security system, with a benchmark of ¿ = 0 (no social security).
Remaining Parameters and Data
The remaining parameters (º; Ã; ¼ 1 ;¯) are chosen jointly so that the benchmark model competitive equilibrium delivers the following statistics, discussed in detail in Constantinides et al. (2001) and Smetters (2000) , which also consider OLG models with aggregate uncertainty, where agents live for only a small number of periods and thus a model period has to be interpreted as 20 years. Note that the¯rst 2 facts are motivated by the discussion in Constantinides et al. (2001) , the second two facts by Smetters (2001).
1. An average return on risky capital of about 6:5% per annum Loosely speaking, the parameter¯determines the average return on capital, the shock to TFP, º; determines the variability of aggregate output, conditional on º the shock to depreciation Ã determines the variability of interest rates and the probability ¼ 1 determines how correlated returns to capital and labor are. 6 The parameters required for model-generated statistics to coincide with the four empirical observations stated above are (º; Ã; ¼ 1 ;¯) = (0:15; 2:13; 0:499; 0:46): We make the following observations. First, the time discount factor¯= 0:46 implies an annual time discount rate of 4%: Second, the fact that ¼ 1 = ¼ 4 = 0:499 is required comes from the fact that returns to labor and capital are highly positively correlated for 20 year time periods in the data. In order for the model to reproduce this observations it has to be very unlikely that TFP-shocks and depreciation shocks of opposite direction occur simultaneously. The relative magnitude of TFP-shocks and depreciation shocks is explained by the fact that returns to risky capital are much more volatile in the data than is aggregate output. Since TFP-shocks a®ect both returns as well as output directly, the size of these shocks have to be somewhat moderate for output not to be too volatile. Given this, depreciation shock have to be of large magnitude to generate returns to capital that are su±ciently volatile in the model.
The required parameter values do not seem to be implausible, with the exception of the high variance of the depreciation shock. In particular, the size of Ã = 2:13 implies that the depreciation rate can be bigger than 100% and smaller than 0%; which makes an economic interpretation of these shocks as depreciation shocks problematic. Alternatively these shocks may be interpreted as shocks to the aggregate production function that do not a®ect real wages. These shocks are required to be large in order to generate returns to capital with su±cient volatility. Table 1 summarizes the parameterization of the model. 
The Closed Economy
We now document what the welfare consequence are from unexpectedly introducing a pay-as-you-go social security system into the economy, with size ¿ = 0:02; the initial size of the US social security system at its introduction in 1935.
In the economy with social security the average aggregate capital stock is 9:2% lower than in the benchmark without social security, and average output and wages are 3:1% lower. Figure 3 summarizes the welfare consequences from the reform, if the reform is introduced at a point where the aggregate capital stock is at the high end of the support of the ergodic prereform capital distribution. As in Figure 1 at each node of the event tree we document the welfare gains, measured as percentage consumption equivalent variation, from the reform for a generation that is born at that node; for example ¡1:4 in node (2; 4; 3) indicates that at agent born in that node would require 1:4% more consumption in each contingency of her life with social security being introduced at node z = z 2 to be as well o®, in terms of expected lifetime utility, as under the situation where social security was not introduced at all. For the initial nodes we also report consumption equivalent variation for generations already alive at the time of the reform.
Not surprisingly all generations already alive bene¯t from the introduction of the system since they receive bene¯ts without having (fully) contributed. The initial old bene¯t strongest in states where returns to the capital they have accumulated for retirement are low. 7 The current middle-aged generation also uniformly bene¯ts from the introduction of social security, because it receives full pensions and has to contribute only in one period. The ranking of states in which this generation bene¯ts most is subtle, however. On one hand states with currently low wages make social security a good deal because small contributions (in absolute terms) stand against average pensions (because of the iid nature of the shocks). On the other hand there is a strong general equilibrium e®ect: low wages today mean low savings and thus a low capital stock tomorrow, with high average returns to capital tomorrow which make the implicit return to social security look relatively bad. The same is true for high depreciation shocks today that reduce the capital stock for tomorrow. This e®ect is sufciently strong for middle-aged agents to prefer the introduction of social security more in high-wage states z 1 ; z 2 than in low-wage states z 3 ; z 4 and in low-depreciation states z 1 ; z 3 than in high-depreciation states z 2 ; z 4 : 8
Generations born at the time of the reform bene¯t slightly (between 0:004% and 0:3%) from the introduction of social security even though they face full contributions for their bene¯ts, whereas generations born after the reform su®er losses between 0:8% and 2:2% in terms of consumption equivalent variation. 9 The reason for the di®erence between generations born today and later is explained by endogenous capital accumulation: the introduction of social security reduces private saving and thus capital accumulation, private consumption and wages along the transition to a new stochastic steady state. Since this transition takes some time, this detrimental e®ect does not hit the current generation in its full extent, but is experienced by future generations to a larger and larger extent, until the transition period is completed and welfare e®ects from the reform converge.
Finally we observe that the welfare consequences of an introduction of social security are ranked by aggregate shocks as being most bene¯cial (least harmful) in z 2 ; then in z 1 ; followed by z 4 and then z 3 : The reason for this ranking for newborns is similar as for the current middle-aged, with an added subtlety, since newborns still have 2 more periods to live. A negative shock to current total factor productivity a®ects both the current young and middle-aged agents negatively, depresses savings for both generations, and thus tomorrow's capital stock is low and the return on capital is high tomorrow. Tomorrow the then middle-aged agents have saved little, therefore save relatively little for the last period of their life and the capital stock is low and returns are high in their last period of life. Thus a bad TFP shock today is associated with high returns to private capital in all future periods of a currently young generations' life, which makes social security look relatively bad in these aggregate states (z 3 and z 4 ). On the other hand, a large depreciation shock reduces the capital stock tomorrow and generates high returns tomorrow; but since the current young now save a lot (high returns, current wages una®ected by depreciation shock) the capital stock rebounds quickly and is at average level when the current young are old, so that returns from capital are only mediocre when they retire. So a bad depreciation shock today yields high returns and low wages tomorrow and average returns in the period after that, whereas a good depreciation shock yields low returns and high wages tomorrow and average returns after this. The wage e®ect dominates and agents bene¯t from social security more in states with bad depreciation shocks (z 2 ; z 4 ) than with good depreciation shocks. 10 In order to assess the dependence of the welfare consequences from the introduction of social security on the aggregate state of the world, in Figure  4 we report welfare numbers for the same experiment as before, but with the initial capital stock at the time of the reform being at the low, rather than the high end of the pre-reform ergodic capital distribution.
One observes, comparing Figures 3 and 4 , that qualitatively the results are somewhat similar, but that the introduction of social security is more favorable to current young and middle-aged generations with initially high, rather than initially low capital stock, since private returns to capital are fairly low (but not dynamically ine±ciently low) with a high capital stock and thus social security does not look so unattractive with respect to its implicit return on retirement saving. The¯gures also show, however, that the initial capital stock hardly plays any role for generations born even one period after the introduction of social security. In summary, judged from its welfare implications a social security reform seems most promising in aggregate conditions characterized by a high aggregate capital stock, bad shocks to the returns to capital and relatively high real wages.
A Small Open Economy
In our model the bene¯cial intergenerational risk sharing role associated with the introduction of unfunded social security has to be traded o® with the adverse e®ect on capital accumulation. In a small open economy the latter e®ect is absent and the e®ect of social security on the allocation of aggregate risk among generations can be analyzed most clearly.
Therefore in this section we assume that the total supply of capital is independent of the aggregate domestic savings in the economy. The de¯ni-tion of a competitive equilibrium is as in De¯nition 1 above, with the crucial di®erence that we replace the capital market clearing condition by
for some exogenously given supply of capital ¹ K. The de¯nition of a FREE is analogous. 11 Introducing unfunded social security in this world lowers the average return on savings for retirement with capital from 6:5% per annum to (1 + n)(1 + g) ¡ 1 = 2:7% per annum for retirement saving via the social security system. However, social security pools labor and capital income risk across generations since returns to labor and capital are imperfectly correlated and thus reduces the variance of consumption for each generation. The welfare consequences of introducing social security then depend on the relative importance of mean consumption and the riskiness of consumption. Note that under the small open economy assumption the mean and variance of returns to capital and labor are independent of the preference parameters (¾;¯): Therefore, for a given¯; since ¾ controls risk aversion there exists a one-to-one mapping between ¾ and the welfare consequences from the introduction of social security, with higher degrees of risk aversion unambiguously associated with higher welfare gains.
In order to make the results in this section comparable to those in the previous section we re-calibrate the model to the same observations. We choose the same¯= 0:46 as in the previous section (note that¯does not a®ect the return to saving anymore) and pick ¹ K so that the annual mean return on capital is 6:5% per annum. In order to match the same volatility of output, return to capital and correlation between labor and capital returns as before we choose (º; Ã; ¼) = (0:2; 1:55; 0:499):
In Table 2 we summarize the welfare consequences of the introduction of social security of size ¿ = 2% for di®erent degrees of risk aversion. Note that, absent e®ects of capital accumulation and given the iid nature of aggregate shocks all generations born after the introduction of the system experience the same welfare consequences as the generation born at the time of the reform, given the same aggregate shock z: Furthermore, since agents are born with no capital, the welfare consequences di®er only across states for which returns to labor di®er, but not across states for which returns to capital di®er. 12 We¯nd that, not surprisingly, the initial old and middle aged agents have large welfare gains from the introduction of social security because they receive bene¯ts without having contributed to the system at all (the initial old) or having only contributed for one period. For the initial old the bene¯ts are particularly high in states z 2 and z 4 in which returns to capital are low and wages are high, since their bene¯ts depend on current wages in the economy.
The currently middle-aged agents also bene¯t from the reform, albeit not as strongly. For them it is states with currently low wages (z 3 and z 4 ) that make social security look really attractive since they contribute little in absolute terms (payroll taxes are proportional to wages) and can expect average pensions (since aggregate shocks are iid and the aggregate capital shock does not depend on the history of aggregate shocks).
In order for the introduction of social security to generate a Pareto improvement the welfare consequences for newborn generations are decisive. We see that for moderate risk aversion the reduction in mean returns for part of their retirement portfolio generates welfare losses from social security, whereas for high risk aversion, with ¾ = 4, enhanced risk sharing overcompensates the reduction in mean consumption. 13 So if agents are 12 The welfare consequences for the initial old and middle aged generation evidently depend on these generations' holdings of capital; we display numbers for holdings in the middle of the pre-reform ergodic distribution. Welfare consequences for other holdings (that have positive probability under the per-reform ergodic distribution) are of similar magnitude and display the same order with respect to the exogenous shock z. 13 The initial old agents have no risk remaining. The fact that their welfare gains a slightly higher for high risk aversion is entirely due to the fact that for ¾ = 4 they have saved less for retirement on average (where averages refer to the pre-reform ergodic distribution) and thus bene¯t more from the reform. Currently middle-aged agents still face substantial risk, which explains that their welfare gains increase with their degree of risk aversion, for the same intuitive reasons described for the newborns.
fairly risk averse and social security does not crowd out the aggregate capital stock (because of the small open country assumption), then even for a realistically calibrated economy the introduction of a (small) unfunded and redistributive social security system may constitute a Pareto improving policy innovation, since it enhances the sharing of risk across generations. 14 
Conclusion
Can the introduction of an unfunded social security system provide a Pareto improvement by facilitating intergenerational risk sharing? In this paper we argue that, in the presence of incomplete markets, it potentially can do so in a quantitatively important way. However, in a realistically calibrated economy the intergenerational risk sharing role of unfunded social security is dominated in its importance by the adverse e®ect on capital accumulation arising from the introduction of such a system. Three immediate avenues for future research remain. Quantitatively, it would be desirable to increase the number of generations populating the economy at a given point of time. This would enable us to interpret the stochastic shocks as real business cycle shocks and calibrate them correspondingly. As we argue in Krueger and Kubler (2001) , our computational algorithm can handle up to nine generations, but an alternative numerical algorithm based on an approximation of the cross-sectional wealth distribution (instead of its exact representation, as in the current paper) is needed as the number of generations becomes larger. Such an algorithm has been provided by Krusell and Smith (1998) for in¯nite horizon models and been applied to overlapping generations economies of the form studied in this paper by Storesletten et al. (2000) and Gourinchas (2001) . In our earlier paper we show, however, that the numerical accuracy of this algorithm may su®er substantially if one considers aggregate shocks of the order of magnitude similar to the great depression.
14 We observe that for ¾ = 1 the welfare losses are bigger in states z 1 and z 2 where current wages are high than in states z3 and z4 where current wages are low and social security has a better implicit return. It then may seem surprising that the ordering of states is reversed for ¾ = 4: But if agents are very risk averse, since capital is quite risky and therefore a bad asset to hold for agents, young agents short the asset (with ¾ = 1 they are savers even when young). The introduction of social security and associated forced saving for retirement makes them short the risky asset even more, in particular in low-wage states z 3 and z4: This adverse e®ect of social security is insu±cient to overcome the bene¯ts from enhanced risk sharing, but explains why the welfare gains from the introduction of social security are larger in high-wage states z 1 ; z 2 than in low-wages states z 3 ; z 4 : Secondly, the current paper abstracts from several bene¯cial roles of an unfunded, redistributive social security system. In the presence of incomplete¯nancial markets social security provides a partial substitute for missing insurance markets against idiosyncratic labor income and lifetime uncertainty. On the other hand the distortive e®ects of payroll taxes on the labor supply decision remain unmodeled as well. e abstract from these features to more clearly isolate the potential magnitude of the bene¯cial intergenerational risk sharing role of social security. A complete assessment of its relative quantitative importance, compared to the intragenerational risk sharing and distortion e®ects would require incorporating these e®ects explicitly, however. Whereas elastic labor supply would add limited complexity to the numerical algorithm by adding simply a control variable, allowing for uninsurable idiosyncratic uncertainty would generate intragenerational heterogeneity, a nontrivial wealth distribution within generations and thus induce the same curse of dimensionality that occurs when expanding the number of generations in the model.
Finally, in this paper we assess whether social security should be introduced under certain aggregate economic conditions. Our normative analysis, however, is silent about the political con°ict potentially surrounding the adoption, reform or termination of social security. An extension of the work of Cooley and Soares (1997) and Boldrin and Rustichini (2000) to our environment with aggregate uncertainty would be needed to address the question why, if not mutually bene¯cial, the US social security system was introduced when it was introduced and who one should expect the major supporters of this reform to be.
